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Abstract
Matching unfamiliar faces is known to be difficult, and this can give an opportunity to those
engaged in identity fraud. Here we examine a relatively new form of fraud, the use of photo-
ID containing a graphical morph between two faces. Such a document may look sufficiently
like two people to serve as ID for both. We present two experiments with human viewers,
and a third with a smartphone face recognition system. In Experiment 1, viewers were
asked to match pairs of faces, without being warned that one of the pair could be a morph.
They very commonly accepted a morphed face as a match. However, in Experiment 2, fol-
lowing very short training on morph detection, their acceptance rate fell considerably. Never-
theless, there remained large individual differences in people’s ability to detect a morph. In
Experiment 3 we show that a smartphone makes errors at a similar rate to ‘trained’ human
viewers—i.e. accepting a small number of morphs as genuine ID. We discuss these results
in reference to the use of face photos for security.
Introduction
The use of fraudulent ID is a significant societal problem. In this study we examine one
potential route to fraud: the use of a manipulated facial image in a photo-ID. The extensive
psychological literature on face processing suggests a number of vulnerabilities that could be
exploited by people wishing to deceive ID checkers (human or machine), and here we con-
sider the use of graphical morphing.
Passports carry a photo of the bearer, and are the target of fraud across many countries. To
deter this, anti-counterfeit measures have become increasingly sophisticated, for example
through the inclusion of invisibly printed patterns detectable only under particular artificial
illumination. As these measures are difficult to circumvent, criminal attacks on passport sys-
tems are increasingly focussing on ‘Fraudulently Obtained Genuine’ documents, or FOGs [1–
2]. These are real documents issued to fraudulent applicants. This means that passport-issuing
authorities must address the challenge of detecting incorrect details on applications—includ-
ing ID photographs.
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Passport officials checking IDs may have access to other photos of the applicant, for exam-
ple images from earlier applications or other official documents such as driving licences. How-
ever, checking two different images of an unfamiliar person is known to be very difficult and
prone to error [3–4]. Furthermore, comparing a real person to a photo is just as difficult as
comparing two photos [5–7], and the problem becomes harder as the time between the photos
increases, as in passport renewals [8]. This difficulty is not confined to novice viewers: White
et al [9] demonstrated that a group of working passport officers were no better at face match-
ing than a group of untrained students. So, it seems clear that a fraudulent application with a
false photograph may not be easy to detect.
In the experiments below, we address a recent phenomenon which could make fraudulent
photos even harder to detect—the use of face morphs [10–11]. In one form of attack, a com-
plicit passport owner submits a renewal application with the photo of a second person. The
aim is to find pairs of people (legitimate owner and second person) who look sufficiently alike
that a discrepancy will not be noticed—i.e. to exploit the difficulty of this task for a viewer. In a
development of this attack, a photo may be submitted which is a morph between the legitimate
owner and the second person—with the aim that the resulting image looks sufficiently like
both parties to become acceptable photo-ID for either [11]. Graphical morphing is now widely
available, and allows for generation of a near-continuous sequence of images forming interme-
diate steps between one image and another. The central point of this continuum could be said
to contain equal amounts of each original photo.
Psychological evidence, at first glance, suggests that this may not be a very efficient form
of attack. Early research with image morphing suggested that perception of identity is cate-
gorical, i.e. perception of identity does not blend along the continuum. Instead, there is a
boundary somewhere between the two original images, and identity is seen clearly for one of
the individuals either side of that boundary [12]. However, this early research was conducted
with familiar faces. The situation is more nuanced with unfamiliar faces [13–15], and cate-
gorical perception seems to rely on explicit training of the two identities before testing [16]–
training which would not be available to viewers processing a passport application. Further-
more, in many categorical perception tasks, participants are asked whether a particular image
represents person A or person B. This is not the problem facing a passport checker, who
instead has to decide whether a single person is or is not legitimate.
In Experiments 1 and 2 we assess the extent to which computer generated morphs are
accepted as a genuine face photo, when participants are unaware (Experiment 1) and aware
(Experiment 2) of the use of face morphs in passport fraud. Advances in technology mean that
automatic face recognition systems are now common, both in high-security settings like bor-
der-gates, and also in personal electronics, e.g., for access to mobile phones. In Experiment 3
we test a highly popular mobile phone, equipped with face recognition security, and ask
whether it can withstand attack using a morphed image.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, we examined the extent to which computer generated face morphs are
acceptable as genuine matching ID. Across a set of trials, viewers were asked to decide whether
a photo-ID (passport) matched a second face image or not. In fact, sometimes the faces
matched, sometimes they did not, and sometimes the ID photo was a morph between a match-
ing and non-matching face. As the fraudulent use of face morphs is a recent development, we
wanted first to assess identity-checkers’ performance when they were not told to expect that
some of the images would have been graphically manipulated, and so no mention was made of
this possibility in the instructions. We anticipated that viewers would quite frequently be
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willing to accept morphed images as true matches, particularly if they contained a substantial
proportion of the paired identity. However, we were particularly interested to observe accep-
tance rates at the 50/50 level (presumably the most useful in real fraud). We were also inter-
ested to observe whether acceptance rates declined smoothly (as the match image contained
less and less of the target) or exhibited a step function signifying categorical perception, as
described above.
Method
Ethics statement. This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department
of Psychology, University of York. All participants gave written informed consent.
Participants. Twenty eight participants (25 female) with a mean age of 20 years (SD = 3,
Range = 18–31) were recruited from the University of York Department of Psychology. All
participants were naïve to the purpose of the study and received a course credit or monetary
payment for their participation.
Stimuli and apparatus. Facial images were taken from a standardised test of face match-
ing, the Glasgow Face Matching Test, GFMT [17]. That test comprises pairs of face photos
taken with two different cameras on the same day—sometimes showing the same person, and
sometimes different people. In the original test, image pairs are cropped around the face, and
presented side-by-side. To create stimuli for this experiment, we presented the full, uncropped
image for one of the pair, at a size of 14cm x 10.5cm. The second photo was embedded in a UK
passport frame, using the dimensions of real UK passports (frame: 8.8cm x 12.5cm; photo
3.5cm x 4.5cm). Fig 1 shows an example.
Stimuli for the experiment comprised images of forty nine identities (19 female) from the
GFMT. For each target face, match and mismatch images were drawn from the test. We also
created images in which the photo to be embedded within a passport frame (Fig 1) was a
morph between the match and mismatch face. Image manipulation software Psychomorph
Fig 1. Photographic comparison. An example trial in which the passport photo contains 50% of the target identity (left) and 50% of
the fraudster’s image (right, embedded in the passport frame). The individuals shown in Fig 1 have given written informed consent (as
outlined in PLOS consent form) to publish these images.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173319.g001
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[18] was used to create five morphed images per pair of identities; the images were trans-
formed from one ID to the other in steps of 20%. Consequently, for each identity there was an
uncropped GFMT target image and 7 passport photos; 100% match, 100% mismatch, and
morphs with ratios of match/mismatch: 90/10; 70/30; 50/50; 30/70; 10/90. Fig 2 shows an
example. All images were presented on a 12-inch Hewlett Packard laptop using E-Prime 2.0.
Procedure. Participants were presented with two images on each trial, as shown in Fig 1.
The uncropped target image always appeared on the left side of the display and the passport
photo always appears on the right. Each participant was told that they were taking on the role
of a passport inspection officer at an airport and that on each trial they would encounter a
‘traveller’ (target image) bearing a passport (passport frame and photo). They were instructed
to decide whether or not the traveller’s face matched their passport photo (Press ‘1’) or did not
(Press ‘2’).
Each participant completed 49 trials (7 of each morph level, presented in a random order).
Each trial remained onscreen until response. The experiment was counterbalanced such that
across participants, each target image was paired with each of its morph-level passport photos
on an equal number of occasions.
Results and discussion
Fig 3 shows the acceptance rates for passport photos across the different levels of morphing.
Error rates for the endpoints (100% match and 100% mismatch) are low (9% and 8% respec-
tively) and consistent with average population performance on the GFMT (Long form, [17]).
Single-factor ANOVA across conditions shows a strong influence of morph level (F(6,162) =
181.54, p< 0.001, η2 = .87). Tukey HSD comparisons between morph levels show no signifi-
cant difference in acceptance rates between 100%, 90% and 70% morphs, but a significant
drop between levels 70% and 50% (F = 33.75, p< 0.01), with further significant drops in steps
50% to 30% (F = 82.51, p< 0.01), and 30% to 10% (F = 19.03, p< 0.01).
While 50/50 target morphs were accepted as genuine matches less frequently than genuine
photos, they were nevertheless accepted at a surprisingly high level. An acceptance rate of 68%
suggests that this type of image, when used as fraudulent ID, might sometimes serve the pur-
pose of providing acceptable documentation for two different people. However, note that in
this experiment, we did not alert the participants to the possibility that some of the photos may
have been graphically manipulated. We assumed that viewers would reject as ‘fraudulent’ any
image that they noticed had been manipulated—however, it is possible that they made more
sophisticated judgements than this, accepting manipulated images as long as they retained
Fig 2. Morph levels used in passport frames for Experiments 1 and 2. The individuals shown in Fig 2 have given written informed
consent (as outlined in PLOS consent form) to publish these images.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173319.g002
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some likeness of the second image. In the following experiment, we repeat the matching task,
but instruct viewers to look out for these manipulated images.
Experiment 2
This experiment used the identical stimuli and procedure as Experiment 1, with the exception
that this time, participants were briefed in advance about the possibility of ‘fraudulent’ ID
using graphics morphing, and during the test were given an extra response option. When try-
ing to match the face photos (see Fig 1), they now had the options to respond ‘match’, ‘mis-
match’ or ‘morph’. We examined whether this prior warning would affect their accuracy in
judging the photo ID. We were also interested to observe patterns of individual differences in
people’s abilities to spot fraudulent (morphed) images. In particular, how does the ability to
spot a morph relate to people’s matching performance on unaltered images? It is well-estab-
lished that there are large individual differences in people’s unfamiliar face matching perfor-
mance [17], and this is exploited through recruitment of ‘super-recognisers’ by professional
groups including London’s Metropolitan Police [19]. However, it is not clear whether individ-
uals who are good (or poor) at face matching would be correspondingly good (or poor) at
detecting graphically-manipulated face images. For this reason, we examined the relationship
between these two abilities in this experiment.
Method
Ethics statement. This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department
of Psychology, University of York. All participants gave written informed consent.
Participants. Forty two participants (34 female) with a mean age of 21 years (SD = 3,
Range = 18–31) were recruited from the University of York Department of Psychology. All
participants were naïve to the purpose of the study and received a course credit or monetary
payment for their participation.
Procedure. The experimental stimuli, apparatus and procedure used in the present exper-
iment were identical to those described in Experiment 1, with the exception that an extra
response option was made available on each trial. Prior to the experiment, participants were
Fig 3. Mean passport image acceptance rates across morph levels for Experiment 1. (Error bars denote
standard error.)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173319.g003
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given instructions about the morphing technique, and were shown an example sequence of
images morphing between faces. They were also instructed that they could spot morphs from
image irregularities such as ‘the ghost outline of another face’. They were instructed to examine
image pairs in each trial carefully, and to decide whether the person shown in the passport
image was the same person as the target (match), a different person (mismatch) or a morphed
image.
Results and discussion
Performance levels. Fig 4 shows the mean responses (match, mismatch, morph) given to
images containing different levels of the target identity. Error rates for endpoints (100% match
and 100% mismatch) are low, and consistent with average population performance on the
GFMT (Long version). Two factor ANOVA (Response Type x Morph Level) confirms the
interaction which is clear in Fig 4 (F(12,492) = 125.2, p< 0.001, η2 = .75). Tukey HSD tests
performed across Simple Main Effects of Morph Level show the following. For Match
Responses, there is no significant difference between 100% and 90%, or in steps between 50%,
30%, 10% and 0. However, there are significant drops in Match responses for each of the steps
between 90%, 70% and 50% (F = 117.6 and 25.2 respectively). Furthermore, there is a signifi-
cant difference in performance for pairwise comparison of 50% and 0% levels (F = 13.0). This
pattern is echoed for Mismatch responses: There are no significant differences between 100%
and 50% morph levels, but there are significant rises in ‘Mismatch’ responses for each of the
steps between 50%, 30%, 10% and 0% (F = 30.2, 93.0 and 8.8, respectively). Morph detection is
a clear function of morph level, with maximum detection at 50/50 morph (Fig 4). Tukey HSD
comparisons show no significant differences between 100% and 90% or between 10% and 0%,
but reliable effects at each step in between (steps from 90% to 10%, Fs = 119.5, 23.2, 9.9, 99.9
respectively).
Fig 4. Mean response rates across morph levels for Experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173319.g004
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This pattern shows very marked improvements over Experiment 1. When not briefed about
the possibility of ‘morph-fraud’, participants in the first experiment accepted 50/50 morphs as
genuine ID at a rate of 68%. However, participants told to expect some morph images, are now
accepting 50/50 as genuine at only 21%. This is a very large reduction—though note that it is
still far from perfect performance, and remains significantly higher than baseline—the level at
which viewers accept a mismatched photo (8% here). So, it appears that prior instructions can
greatly improve errors of false acceptance, but not eliminate them entirely.
Individual differences. For each participant, we first calculated an accuracy score based
only on the non-morphed images (i.e. simple match or non-match identities). This represents
a subset of the items from the GFMT (14 items, 7 match/7 mismatch), and we expect to
observe some individual differences in these scores, based on previous research. These scores
are plotted in Fig 5, against the participants’ ability to detect a 50/50 morph—i.e. the propor-
tion of times they responded ‘morph’ to these images, across the experiment. It is clear from
Fig 5 that there are large individual differences in both these dimensions. In particular, note
that there was a huge range in the rate at which individual participants spotted morphs—rang-
ing from 14% to 100%, across the experiment. Pearson correlation shows no significant associ-
ation between face matching ability and morph-detection (r = .28, N = 42, p = .073).
We next examined associations between morph detection and face matching separately for
match and mismatch GFMT items only. Previous work [20] has shown a dissociation between
performance on matching and mismatching items, and this was replicated in the current data
Fig 5. Face matching plotted against proportion of 50/50 morphs detected (some points over-lay).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173319.g005
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(r = 0.13, N = 42, p = 0.38)–though note that this is based on only a small number of items (7
match and 7 mismatch) per participant. The detailed analysis revealed an interesting pattern.
There was no association between morph detection and accuracy for matching items
(r = 0.006, N = 42, p = 0.97). However, there was a significant association between morph
detection and accuracy for mismatching items (r = 0.36, N = 42, p = 0.019). In general, people
who were good at spotting morphs were also good at spotting that two unmanipulated pictures
showed different faces.
This is an interesting result, because it uncovers the component of face matching ability
that is associated with fraudulent morph detection. This is relevant for professional bodies
recruiting specialist facial analysts (or ‘super-recognisers’), as it demonstrates that the different
components involved in checking validity of photo-ID can manifest in different ways. Note
that all the participants in this study had received some training, in that they were alerted to
graphical ‘fraud’ at the start of the experiment, and had been shown examples. Nevertheless, as
can be seen in Fig 5, some participants were able to perform normal unfamiliar face matching
at outstanding levels of performance (100% in some cases) while being very poor at detecting
these fraudulent images. The 50/50 morph tested here is the most useful for potential fraud-
sters, as it gives the highest likelihood of being accepted as photo-ID for two different people
(Experiment 1). However, it is also the image with the largest amount of graphical change and
is generally the easiest to spot (Fig 4). It is therefore very striking that the overall levels of per-
formance incorporate such a vast set of individual differences—differences which add further,
independent, complexity to the problem of identity matching.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 show some of the limits of morph detection by human viewers. In this
final experiment, we ask whether an automated face-recognition device is vulnerable to
morphed ID. Automated face recognition is becoming very common both in high security set-
tings such as border control, and in more everyday settings such as accessing a mobile phone.
In previous work [21] we have shown that a face recognition system used to unlock a smart-
phone, can benefit greatly from some graphical manipulation. In particular, we showed that
storing an ‘average’ of the owner’s face, derived from several different images of the same per-
son, can significantly enhance the operation—forming a representation which recognises the
user over a wide range of conditions. In this study, we ask whether a smartphone might be sus-
ceptible to accepting a morph between two individuals—hence rendering it unable to distin-
guish the two. To test this, we asked volunteers to try to unlock the device using its built-in
face recognition system. We had previously stored an image of this ‘user’ (which should allow
access), an image of another person (which should deny access) or an image containing a
morph between the two.
Method
Ethics statement. This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department
of Psychology, University of York. All participants gave written informed consent.
Participants. Twenty participants (18 female) with a mean age of 23 years (SD = 6,
Range = 19–43) were recruited from the University of York Department of Psychology. All
participants were naïve to the purpose of the study and received a course credit or monetary
payment for their participation.
Smartphone specifications. A Samsung Galaxy S3 smartphone with an Android operat-
ing system (v.4.4.2) was used in the present experiment. The face authentication security
feature is part of the standard software package installed on the device. Throughout the
ID fraud with face morphs
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experiment, the phone was placed in ‘flight mode’, a feature which disables all wireless func-
tions while retaining full use of the camera. To capture the live face of the user, the recognition
algorithm relies on a front-facing two megapixel camera/video recorder (30 frames/s).
Stimuli. Photos of each participant were taken with an iPhone-6, 8-mega-pixel camera, in
good indoor lighting. These were cropped to 270 x 348 pixels for subsequent use in morphing
software. For each participant, we chose a face from the GFMT (i.e. those images used in
Experiments 1 and 2), which gave rise to the same general description. This face acted as the
‘mismatching’ person in the tests. (NB—for three participants, it was not possible to choose a
corresponding mismatch pair from the GFMT faces, because the database is entirely Caucasian
and the volunteer participants were not. For these three faces, we chose a foil by internet search
instead. All subsequent analysis was conducted with and without these participants, in case
this difference introduced a systematic effect. However, there are no qualitative differences
between analyses including or excluding these participants, and so we report the inclusive
analysis.)
Following the same method described for Experiments 1 and 2, Psychomorph was used to
create the morphed images for each identity in a pair, resulting in a matching face, a mis-
matching face, and 5 morphed intermediates containing between 90% and 10% of the target.
Fig 6 shows an example.
Procedure. Participants were requested to activate the phone’s face recognition software
by pressing the ‘power’ button and presenting their face to the inbuilt camera. The smartphone
would then either allow or deny the user access. Prior to this, the experimenter had loaded the
smartphone with one of the images relevant to that participant, i.e. their own face, the mis-
match face chosen for them, or one of the morphs between these two. Participants were always
unaware of which photo was stored on the phone for any trial, and the order of images tested
was randomised. Testing took place in good lighting, in an office with artificial light and a
large window. For each stored image, participants made 10 attempts to open the phone. They
were asked to rotate their swivel chairs round the whole 360 degrees across the 10 attempts to
open the camera, in order to incorporate naturalistic and unsystematic changes in lighting
conditions.
Results and discussion
Fig 7 shows acceptance rates for faces at different morph levels. Error rates at endpoints show
that the phones are not perfect in giving access to genuine users (91.8% acceptance for the
matching image), but never give access to the foil. Single-factor ANOVA across conditions
shows a strong influence of morph level (F(6,114) = 78.4, p< .001, η2 = .80). Tukey HSD com-
parisons between morph levels show no significant difference in acceptance rates between
100% and 90%, but significant drops between steps 90%, 70% and 50% (F = 14.16 and 39.0
respectively), and between 50% and 0% (F = 17.34).
Fig 6. Morph levels between a participant and a foil face from the GFMT. The individuals shown in Fig 6
have given written informed consent (as outlined in PLOS consent form) to publish these images.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173319.g006
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These results indicate that the automatic face recognition system tested here is relatively
safe from morphed identity attacks. The system does accept 50% morphs at a rate of 27%—
and while this is perhaps not ideal, the acceptance rate falls well below a level at which two
faces would be indistinguishable. In general, the decision ‘strategy’ of the device is conservative
—making only denial of entry errors, and never allowing an ‘imposter’ access to the system.
This conservative strategy also protects against a potential vulnerability identified in Experi-
ment 1 for novice human viewers.
General discussion
We have presented three experiments examining the potential of facial morphs for use in
fraudulent documents. In each of these we have tested human (Experiments 1 and 2) or smart-
phone (Experiment 3) recognition across a series of images gradually morphing one face into
another. However, the most interesting case across experiments is the 50/50 morph, which
contains equal contribution from two faces. This provides a potential route to fraud, as it
could be seen as sufficiently similar to each contributing person to serve as photo-ID for both.
So, for example, in the case of passports, one person might apply for the document, and
another person use it to cross borders.
Our results are generally encouraging—suggesting that this form of attack is unlikely to
prove very efficient. Although viewers are willing to accept 50/50 morphs as true ID at worry-
ingly high rates (68%, Experiment 1) it is relatively easy to reduce this error rate significantly
(to 21% in Experiment 2) by some simple instructions. Furthermore, for the automated tech-
nology tested (a currently popular smartphone) acceptance rates of 50/50 morphs are compa-
rable to trained human perceivers (27% in Experiment 3). While these rates are quite low, they
are far from perfect—and always significantly above acceptance of a fraudulent photo of
another person. This suggests there may, on some occasions, be benefit to fraudsters in using
this approach. However, it is far from being a reliable strategy.
How likely are these results to scale to real world problems? Of course, participants in psy-
chology experiments are certainly not motivated to the level of professionals checking ID in
security-critical settings. Furthermore, the minimal training given in Experiment 2 is likely to
be very scant by comparison to real settings. However, ID checks are not limited to these
Fig 7. Mean acceptance rates across morph levels for Experiment 3. (Error bars denote standard
deviation).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173319.g007
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critical arenas, and photo matching is a routine part of daily life, for example in retail outlets
and bars, where staff sell age-restricted goods. In these settings, it is easily possible that false
acceptance rates at the levels described here could be replicated—as they have been in previous
studies comparing photo-ID to live targets [5–7].
Experiment 2 also revealed large individual differences in participants’ ability to detect
morphs. However, further analysis revealed that this related only to one component of face
matching—i.e. a facility to detect mismatching face photos. It has been known for some time
that certain aspects of face processing are dissociable; people good at one face task are not nec-
essarily good at another. The dissociation reported here is a further reminder that not all tasks
with faces are the same—efficient performance in any applied setting is likely to require a
proper task analysis, with personnel assigned optimally to different subcomponents of the job.
Finally, the morph technique used here was relatively unsophisticated. We used a readily
available morphing program, with no further ‘touching-up’ of the images (see Figs 2 and 6). It
seems entirely reasonable to assume that any serious attempt to produce fraudulent morph
images would eliminate some of the image artefacts introduced by this technique—such as the
shadowing which occurs towards the middle of the morph sequence. It is therefore perhaps
surprising that acceptance rates were as high as they were—and it is possible that these results
underestimate the levels of acceptance for realistic attempts at graphical fraud. Policing of ID
from face photographs remains a complex process, and each new opportunity for fraud
requires psychological, as well as technical, investigation.
Supporting information
S1 Table. Individual subject scores for each of the three experiments.
(XLSX)
S1 Text. Figure permissions.
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